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The Role of Governance in the Cultivation of University as an Ethical 
Enterprise 
Dr. Thomas B. McMorrow 
University of Ontario Institute of Technology 
 
Abstract 
Universities have always relied on financial and other resources to pursue their goals. Over 
the last two decades, the percentage of financial support they receive from government has 
dwindled (Metcalfe, 2010). The expression, “enterprising university”, is generally used to refer 
to post- secondary educational institutions adopting entrepreneurial approaches to locate new 
sources and forms of revenue. Invoking the term in a normative register, some adopt a 
cheerful, triumphant tone (Meyer, 2002), others a gloomy, foreboding one (Lynch, 2006). 
Certain opponents condemn the “enterprising university” for spelling the end of university as 
we know it, whereas certain proponents claim being “enterprising” offers universities their last, 
best chance of survival. I support the characterization of university as an enterprise, but I do 
not think it should be framed exclusively (or even primarily) as an economic one. 
Etymologically, the word ‘enterprise’ means ‘undertaking’— that is, an endeavour, an activity, 
a project through time. This is an apt description of university whose survival and flourishing 
ultimately rely on the commitment of its members. I argue that framing university as an ethical 
undertaking informs while being informed by the following considerations: first, the integrity of 
university as an enterprise; second, the most suitable basis for evaluating the endeavour; 
third, the purposes of the enterprise; fourth, how the undertaking is governed, and lastly, who 
we imagine its undertakers to be. In this paper, I examine each subject in turn. My goal is to 
demonstrate why the university ought to be imagined foremost as an ethical enterprise— a 
shared project of teaching, learning and discovery, fostering each individual’s pursuit of virtue. 
 
The Idea of a University and the Principle of Integrity 
 
It is fitting that this symposium on Higher Education in Transformation would 
be held in Dublin, Ireland. After all, it was in this city, over one hundred and 
sixty years ago, that John Henry Newman delivered his lectures to the 
founding members of Ireland’s first Catholic university. The collection of those 
discourses bears the title, The Idea of a University (1852/1996). It is notable, 
as Margaret Thornton observes, that “a work produced for the gendered, 
elitist, colonial and Catholic Ireland of 150 years ago” strikes such a chord 
with “contemporary postcolonial, egalitarian and secular humanists wrestling 
with mass education” (Thornton, 2004, p. 491). She suggests this is because 
Newman was on to something when he stressed the love of knowledge for its 
own sake as fundamental to the idea of a university. 
 
Of course, Newman was writing in a particular place and time, so it would be 
unwise to simply transpose his idea of a university whole cloth to the 
contemporary context. For example, no longer does the division of intellectual 
labour between academies and universities that existed during the mid-19th 
exist today. Nevertheless, recognizing a conceptual distinction between 
teaching and discovery—the sharing and the pursuit of knowledge— presents 
their relationship as one of interactive complementarity, rather than static 
identity. When they are seen to serve an intellectual purpose, the discovery 
and teaching of knowledge appear to operate symbiotically. It was Newman’s 
characterization of the university’s object as an intellectual one that was 
crucial to his whole argument. For Newman and his audience, it went without 
saying that faith in God and his church offers the heavy duty spiritual 
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machinery necessary to fulfill the Herculean task of overcoming man’s (sic) 
fallen nature (p. 90). By affirming that knowledge is one thing and virtue 
another, Newman is able to do two things: first, trace the limits to pursuing 
knowledge in such a way that underscores its ephemeral character in contrast 
to the supernatural concerns of the Church; and second, demarcate that form 
of human endeavour that a university is uniquely competent to foster. 
 
Newman shows that the activity of cultivating the mind has its own integrity (p. 
7). Accordingly, there must be freedom to pursue that purpose unencumbered 
by external interference, no matter how well-intentioned or valuable in its own 
right that outside influence is. Newman acknowledged the authority of the 
Roman Catholic Church on issues of morality but insisted that the object of a 
university was “an intellectual not a moral one” (p. 3). In this way he sought to 
reconcile the institution’s Catholic character with its identity as a university. 
There is an important lesson to be drawn from Newman’s approach to 
conceiving a “Catholic university”, when imagining an “enterprising” university. 
As profound a role as religious belief would have had for Newman and his co-
founders when it came to justifying decisions about their university, now 
market-based logic has just as strong an influence on the way every 
dimension of university is theorized and practiced. The lesson for us today, 
then, is this: Failure to appreciate the purpose of the institution risks 
compromising its integrity and resulting in a “university” unworthy of the name. 
This does not mean retreating from the marketplace and rejecting the label of 
“the enterprising university” out of hand. After all, as Marginson & Considine 
(2001) wrote over a decade ago, “We live in the age of business and it is plain 
to everyone that the money-changers have long since mortgaged the temple 
(p. 2).” The real question is not whether a university should be enterprising, 
but what kind of enterprise it should be. 
 
The Blind-Spots of a Purely Economic Perspective 
 
Even before the dawning of the age of “academic capitalism” (Slaughter & 
Leslie, 1997) universities could be seen in competition with one another—for 
students, faculty, research funding and recognition. The precipitous decline in 
government funding and concomitant rise in resource-seeking behaviour 
made the sense of competition within third-level education that much more 
acute. The mobility of students and professors, plus the number of credit-
granting institutions had already been increasing; the advent of online learning 
platforms has signalled the latest, most dramatic jump in these trends (Mirlees 
& Alvi 2014). 
 
Moreover, as the amount of money that government agencies were charged 
with distributing shrank, decisions were made to make markets the primary 
allocative mechanism by which such funding would be doled out. Its 
commercial value and/or monetization potential became the chief criteria by 
which to judge the kinds of research projects meriting public investment. 
Thus, the conditions continued to ripen for market-based logic to drive 
university policy. After all, no university wants the 21st century third-level 
education marketplace to leave it locked out on the wrong side of the door. 
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Markets are arenas of exchange and therefore represent a certain type of 
allocative mechanism. The desire (indeed the need) to exchange is so 
fundamental to the condition of human beings that it provides a basic principle 
of human association (Fuller, 1969, p.90). But not all forms of human 
association are exclusively or even primarily transactional in character. While 
there’s no question an economic lens can be brought to bear on any form of 
human interaction, it can only reveal that which is fungible. Thus, where 
goods are non-fungible, markets cannot function as allocative mechanisms. 
To entrust all decision-making to market-based logic is to forfeit the allocation 
of intangible goods. Because markets function by assimilating all goods into 
their use- value, the inassimilable are either squeezed out or made to fit in a 
distorted form. Quantifiability comes to substitute for quality. 
 
The mode of reasoning associated with market analysis is consequentialism. 
As the word suggests, consequentialism is all about results. Everyone adopts 
consequentialist reasoning some of the time. It would be utterly foolish not to. 
Understandably, a point of view trained on the maximization of efficiency or 
enhancement of utility has a great deal of currency in third-level education. An 
economic perspective can reveal a lot, but it also has a considerable blind 
spot, since from this point of view, there is no such thing as quality 
independent of exchange value. Failing to correctly identify what a practice is 
good for, however, can lead to it being used for things for which it is not 
particularly well suited; for example, there are some very good reasons to 
recommend detailed study of the Bible; understanding the scientific evidence 
informing the theory of evolution is not one of them. 
 
The problem with adopting market-based logic arises when it is treated as the 
sole way of thinking about how to act. Given how thoroughly instrumentalist 
such thinking is, it makes it impossible to grasp the value of any human goal 
or activity for its own sake. In the last section of this paper, I argued that the 
real question before us is not whether a university should be enterprising, but 
what kind of enterprise it should be. Another way to put the question is this: 
what does it profit a university to have great enrollment numbers, full coffers, 
and highly esteemed faculty members, if the quest for prestige overwhelms all 
aspiration to virtue? To the extent that, as a human value, the aspiration to 
virtue withstands mathematical computation, market analysis is insensible to 
it. For this reason, an instrumentalist way of thinking about integrity will forever 
stalk around the conceptual edges of its meaning. 
 
When it comes capturing the meaning of the principle of integrity (either for 
individuals or institutions), the limited purchase of market analysis is most 
dramatically displayed by efforts to quantify the reputational benefits that 
accrue to having integrity. And no doubt, attempts along these lines to 
quantify the value of integrity are instrumental in demonstrating its utility; they 
are useless, however, when use-value is not the only thing one wants to 
show. 
 
University decision-makers who resist total enthralment to market-based logic 
may chance their arm on the possibility that the underpinning assumption of 
economic analysis-- that market actors make all of their decisions according to 
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self-interest— is actually not true. Or, that  because all individual market 
actors are subject to bounded rationality, a good number will not act the way 
economic analysis dictates that they are supposed to. Or, finally, that doing 
things for what are felt to be the right reasons may yield longer term economic 
benefits. After all it wasn’t John Harvard’s branding strategy that led to the 
record sales that t-shirts bearing his college’s name have enjoyed. Choices 
informed by a vision of the university’s intellectual object may also end up 
yielding competitive advantages. 
 
The training to perform a finite set of tasks pales in comparison to an 
education in the pursuit of lifelong learning. The more adaptable one is, the 
greater one’s potential contribution within a given work environment will be—
and the more competitive one will be in an ever-changing job market. The rate 
of technological change is such that if students emerge from university with 
mastery over the use of the latest technology—but that’s it—it won’t be long 
before their know- how becomes irrelevant. In this section I have been 
seeking to show the limitations of economic analysis as a way of looking at 
the world and a basis for making decisions about what one should or should 
not do. I have not denied the existence of markets or even the desirability of 
market- based logic. I have just sought to highlight that on both scores, they 
are contingent, not absolute2. 
 
The higher the quality of graduates—the more sharply honed their intellectual 
skills—the more credit redounds to the university. Metaphorically speaking, 
intellectual ability is the most fungible asset in a knowledge-based economy. 
But its potential contribution to market competitiveness only partially accounts 
for its value. An economic explanation cannot do justice to the meaning of an 
education—how it contributes to one’s experience of the world, one’s 
development of an inner life of the mind and of the heart. 
 
That market analysis is insensible to virtue does not make it bad. The defects 
of this particular intellectual lens arise from its manner of use by the viewer 
who either claims whatever cannot be seen in this way is not there or deploys 
the lens itself in a short-sighted manner. It is heady business trying to predict 
relations of supply and demand over time. Focusing on the immediate, 
however, will mean that one’s diagnosis and prescription end up obsolete very 
near after they are made. If one is going to look at benefits of university 
education for students, one should take the long-term view. Of course, as 
economist John Maynard Keynes once noted, “[i]n the long-run we are all 
dead” (Keynes 1923).  When thinking about the kind of education universities 
should offer to their students, the implications of what may seem a rather glib 
remark nonetheless warrant serious attention. 
 
The End or Ends of University as an Enterprise?                                                         2 Markets depend on a given set of institutions to make them viable. The patron saint of neo-
liberalism himself, Friedrich Hayek, acknowledged the establishment of legal concepts, rules 
and institutions regarding property, contract, adjudication, policing etc., as precursors to a 
“free” market (Hayek, 2013). It makes it difficult, then, to characterize the emergence of 
markets as “spontaneous” when it appears to depend on an accumulation of deliberate acts 
(Fuller, 1955, p. 1322) 
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There is a scene in the novel, Stoner, where the eponymous protagonist finds 
himself completely tongue-tied in response to his professor’s question about 
the meaning of a particular Shakespearean sonnet (Williams 2003). What may 
appear on its face to be an unremarkable (albeit regrettably all too 
commonplace) occurrence turns out to be a transformative event for the 
student. As if confronting his own ignorance, his own unknowing, for the first 
time, William Stoner experiences a kind of revelation. He never articulates 
what has changed inside of him but he does end up deciding to switch out of 
agricultural science and pursue a degree in English instead. He proceeds to 
do graduate work and ends up as a professor of English at the very university 
in which his love of the subject began. 
 
Following his anatomy of this scene, reviewer Julian Barnes notes: 
Many [readers] will be reminded of their own lectoral epiphanies, of 
those moments when the magic of literature first made some kind of 
distant sense, first suggested that this might be the best way of 
understanding life. And readers are also aware that this sacred inner 
space, in which reading and ruminating and being oneself happen, is 
increasingly threatened by what Stoner refers to as ‘the world’ – which 
is nowadays full of hectic interference with, and constant surveillance 
of, the individual (Barnes 2013). 
 
Such a moment of discovery is what many university teachers hope will 
happen for each of their students. To feel a connection to the subject, to feel 
personally implicated in its study—that’s the idea of what it means to be a 
student, is it not? The sense of wonder, the pure joy that attends the act of 
learning—this is the experience that unites the researcher, the teacher, and 
the student. What Barnes calls “this sacred inner space, in which reading and 
ruminating and being oneself happen” speaks at once to the very heart of 
intellectual activity and the sanctum we hope university will provide for this at 
once shared and personal endeavour. It is lamentable, if albeit predictable, 
that in an age of rampant consumerist individualism, it is also uncouth to 
speak of the human soul. But what better metaphor is there in the English 
language to describe, in the deepest sense, who we are? Without such a 
conceptual marker, care of the self is blurred with egoism, freedom with 
license, and responsibility with absolute control. Every prescription of a ‘how’ 
is predicated on some idea of a ‘why’, rooted in a belief about what is good. 
Hence W.E.B. Du Bois’ declaration that “the object of all true education is not 
to make men carpenters, it is to make carpenters men” (Du Bois, 1903, p. 63). 
In other words, I would say: no matter the discipline, trade or profession, the 
educational component does not simply lie in the explicit instruction of what to 
do; rather, it is bound up in the implicit invitation to reflect critically on how to 
be. 
 
To conceive the university as an ethical enterprise is to frame the fostering of 
this activity—what Newman called “the real cultivation of the mind”— as the 
raison d’être of the university. That is not to say that it is either the exclusive 
purpose of universities or a purpose exclusive to them. The ends of a 
university are as complex and multiple as those of the people who comprise it. 
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Moreover, if education represents an enlivening of the human spirit, not a 
deadening of the soul, it is irrational to suppose that it should, or even could, 
be confined within the institutional boundaries that human beings themselves 
transcend. Students pass in and out of university, sometimes attaining 
degrees, sometimes not. Some students enter university anticipating 
enlightenment only to end up bitterly disappointed; still others enrol for the 
specific purpose of getting a degree that will open up employment 
opportunities and find themselves enriched in a manner they had never 
expected. What some students seek in a chair in the library, others pursue on 
a pub stool. Some experience conversations with classmates as far more 
fruitful and engaging than listening to the drone of a lecture. Others locate 
intellectually fertile ground either alongside or independently from their formal 
field of study, organizing charitable fund-raisers, participating in debating 
societies, or offering tutoring services. Some may see the act of turning 
inward and away from the world as a chance to escape from reality, while 
others view it as a way of actually deepening their sense of what is real. Like 
any site of human interaction, a university offers opportunities for developing 
all manner of human vice and virtue. 
 
An education, as opposed to mere programming, invites students to 
recognize, in Barnes’ phrase, “a sacred inner space” in which “being oneself” 
may happen. But of course, it is a pyric victory if one can only be oneself, by 
oneself. Imagining university as an ethical, as opposed to strictly economic, 
enterprise reveals that the end of universities does not lie in the endeavour to 
make ends meet. Moreover, to imagine university as an undertaking is to 
expose the inadequacy of an enterprise framed “to advance the prestige and 
competitiveness of the university as an end in itself” (Marginson & Considine, 
p. 5). The ends of university are potentially as plural as the ways in which 
human beings seek to invest their lives with meaning. To facilitate the 
cultivation of the mind is to foster conditions that make associational life within 
universities rewarding. 
 
Imagining university governance interactively 
 
In Robert M. Pirsig’s novel, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, the 
character Phadreus works at “what could euphemistically be called a ‘teaching 
college’…since you teach and you teach…with no time for research” 
(1974/2006, p. 182). In the course on rhetoric in which Phaedrus is trying to 
teach his students quality writing, he delivers a lecture that he calls the 
“Church of Reason” (p. 183). The title is inspired by a newspaper article he 
read in which a local priest was interviewed about some people complaining 
that the church building that had been sold off by the diocese was now 
operating as a bar. The priest was irritated that those complaining did not 
recognize the difference between the Church and the physical building in 
which it had once been located. Phaedrus employs this image to illustrate his 
idea of the university, which he calls “the real University”. The real University 
is not a material object…The real University is a state of mind. It is that great 
heritage of rational thought that has been brought down to us through the 
centuries and which does not exist at any specific location…The real 
University is nothing less than the continuing body of reason itself (p. 185-6). 
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According to Phaedrus, that which is called by the same name—the collection 
of buildings, the formally recognized legal corporation—is really just “the 
location at which conditions have been made favourable” for the real 
university to exist (p.187). Grades, degrees, departments, titles, salaries, 
tuition—these do not of themselves constitute the “real University”. They may 
be part of those conditions that serve to foster the real university’s existence, 
but the life of the university is greater than the mere sum of these elements. 
 
Phaedrus’ account locates the soul of the university in teaching, generating 
new knowledge and evaluating ideas. He is right that absent these animating 
activities, the formal institutional structure of a university is an empty shell. But 
such a disembodied account risks relegating inquiry into a completely abstract 
realm. Locating the university in the endeavours to discover and share 
knowledge offers an antidote to fetishization of a particular institutional form; it 
does not, however, inoculate against the implications that any specific choice 
of institutional design has for the manner in which those activities are 
conceived and carried out (Salamon, 2002: Eliadis et al., 2005). 
 
Undertaking the iterative, complex, and collective challenge of elaborating the 
social, political, economic, cultural, and architectural conditions favourable for 
the university to exist brings one into the realm of ‘governance’. The term, 
‘governance’ signifies something more than simply the one-off or repeated 
direction by the governor of the governed. It is the endeavour of establishing 
baselines for self-directed human interactions, not the project of micro-
managing every single decision that people make (Winston 2001). What is 
sometimes perceived as the greatest obstacle to governing—namely, the 
possibility of people not doing as they are told— is actually what makes 
governance possible. Absent the human capacity to exercise agency, the very 
notion of a rule as a normative guide for human conduct would be untenable. 
Indeed, there would be no such thing as normativity in a world where people 
did not have the ability to recognize it. If people were incapable of basing their 
decisions on what they view as authoritative reference points for their 
interactions, then behaviour among people would be determined as it is 
among a herd of cattle, not by reason-based, inter-subjective communication, 
but through contamination by fear. The manner in which the ends of 
governance (i.e. policy goals) are selected, and pursued (i.e. policy tools) may 
contribute to, or detract from, the degree to which those subject to 
governance see themselves as implicated in, and responsible for their 
accomplishment. The fulfillment of governance objectives always depends on 
participation of the governed. 
 
Sites and modes of governance are plural (Macdonald, 1990; Eliadis et al., 
2005). When it comes to the economy, state governments govern, but so too 
do private multinational corporations. When it comes to universities, markets 
govern, but so too do university administrations (Jones, Shanahan & Goyan, 
2001). At the same time, each university consists not only of a unitary, official 
normative structure; it is composed of multiple human associations, exercising 
overlapping and conflicting authority over their various members (Macdonald 
1990). Within any institution, it is not just “formal instruments and canonical 
wisdom…[but] subtle and informal normative orders that make associational 
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life possible” (p. 419). On first blush, this would appear to further complicate 
the governance endeavour. 
 
However, such limitations to formal institutional authority are necessary 
corollaries to its governance potential. The official governing body— defined 
by its formal institutional structure— does not have to be a faculty association, 
a student union, a designated research group, a specific kind of student club 
etc. when these formal or informal institutions are present. At the same time, 
however, these and many more human associations serve to mediate how 
their members experience life in a university. One’s sense of belonging to 
these myriad groups moulds and mirrors one’s normative commitments 
(Macdonald, 1996). These sites of interaction play an ineluctable role in how 
students and faculty participate—if not explicitly, then implicitly—in the 
governance of the university. Every normative institution has implicit and 
explicit dimensions (Witteveen & Van der Berg, 1999). It is their interplay that 
governs interactions in ways that serve to either further or to undermine 
realization of the university’s mission. As incisive as formal, explicit regulation 
is, the development of the informal and implicit dimensions of relationships is 
vital. 
 
With this in mind, let us consider a question that appears to be at the centre of 
the debate over the ‘enterprising university’. How can institutions such as 
academic senates and professorial tenure—along with principles such as 
academic freedom and academic integrity— be reconciled with the pursuit of 
private funding opportunities, the cultivation of corporate partnerships, the 
generation of commercial reward, the enhancement of market 
competitiveness, and the satisfaction of consumer interests? At issue would 
appear to be the notion of a university institution forming relationships with 
outside, economic actors. Is a university consequently going to develop an 
entrepreneurial identity for itself? I think this inevitable; however, just as it is 
possible to identify the sense of meaning one derives through economic 
exchange with others, as opposed to the maximization of personal profit, as 
the sine qua non of being an entrepreneur, the enterprising activities of a 
university may be framed within the broader endeavour of the university. In 
neither case, however, does it flow as a matter of course. 
 
Deploying formal instruments and attending to informal normative orders are 
vital to avoiding capture by strictly economic interests (Salamon 2002). Thus, 
when it comes to governing a private-public partnership, for example, the 
most pertinent formal normative instrument is no doubt the contractual 
agreement. Terms of a contract lay out a sort of private constitution for the 
parties (Fuller, 1970-71, 311). At the same time, the wider legislative context 
to which parties  are subject serves to establish parameters for negotiation by 
providing which provisions will be enforceable before the courts and which will 
not.  Beyond—and indeed, even through—the negotiation of the formal 
agreement, it is the relationship between the parties that is critical. Indeed, as 
the eminent contracts law professor, Lon Fuller, once alluded, in some cases, 
if the process of working out the contract is performed well enough, then once 
it is signed, it can be put away in a drawer and forgotten about. Now that the 
parties have been able to communicate and establish their expectations of 
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each other, the drafting of the contract has served its purpose (Fuller, 1970-
71, 326-327). 
 
Fulfillment—as opposed to just court-ordered enforcement—of the legal 
agreement turns on the parties’ understandings of why they are in a 
partnership: what they hope to contribute as well as get out of it, what their 
priorities are, and how valuable preservation of their relationship is to them. 
Furthermore, the view each party has of the relationship—and therefore the 
manner in which they perform the public-private-partnership— depends on 
their view of themselves. What are they about? Who are they? What are their 
purposes? What, for them, is beyond the pale? Only with a sense of their own 
mission—an idea of their own identity, and certain standards about what it 
means to keep their integrity— will they know what they want this partnership 
to be. As an economic actor, then, it is vital for universities to undergo the 
iterative process of articulating to themselves what kind of enterprise they 
aspire to be. 
 
In this section I have tried to demonstrate why regaining the ideals 
underpinning the vision of university as an independent institution (free from 
government, corporate or religious interference) host to the pursuit of 
knowledge, discovery and virtue for their own sake (as opposed to their 
monetization potential) neither does, nor should, mean re-establishing the 
sites and modes of governance associated with the halcyon days of 
untrammeled institutional authority. I argue that command-and-control style 
governance risks undermining its potential to be an ethical, not merely, 
economic undertaking. I write of governance, not management to stress the 
facilitation of human agency rather than the exercise of social control. 
 
I argue that the challenge is for those who make up the university to feel a 
sense of implication in, and responsibility for, the university’s mission. To feel 
implicated in and responsible for the order governing one’s life is crucially 
what all governance should be about. The endeavour that is governance 
means that by virtue of its collective character, there are going to be 
conflicting perspectives on, expectations of, and ideals for what such an order 
will entail. Fundamental, then, are: continual recognition of each individual’s 
stake in the order to which he or she is subject, plus active cultivation of 
conditions to foster each person’s role in making that order what it is, can, and 
should be.  
 
Treating these as fundamental means that the processes of working through 
disagreement will be designed in ways that militate against marginalization, 
alienation, oppression, and denigration of the less powerful. Ultimately, it is 
through the actions of those formally being governed, as much as those 
officially doing the governing, that the interplay between patent and latent 
forms of normativity takes place (Macdonald, 1986). I think the only way the 
enterprising university can succeed is if those who constitute it are committed 
to a vision of the university as foremost an ethical rather than an economic 
enterprise. 
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Calling all undertakers: student participation in “the enterprising 
university” 
 
In Canada, tuition payments account for the largest percentage of university 
funding (Statistics Canada, 2007). Zuo & Ratsoy note that “the financial 
restraints facing universities may be leading to a governance structure 
characterized by less participation of students, support staff, and faculty 
members” (1999, p.20). Nonetheless, they argue that because students 
account for the largest proportion of university funding, “students are 
demanding more participation” (p.20). If it is by and through the power of the 
purse that students develop an outsized influence on faculty decisions 
regarding curricular development and teaching methods, buzz words of “the 
enterprising university”— such as “creativity, innovation, and collaboration”— 
will ring hollow. Economic power, exercised in the marketplace, is a much 
blunter instrument than political power exercised through deliberative, 
democratic institutions and processes. Consumerism centres on satisfaction 
of immediate, individual self-interest—and it is the accumulation of that, which 
brings market pressure to bear. What markets do not do, however, is offer 
opportunities for expressions of solidarity or the conscious coordination of 
goals. The choice of exit that dissatisfied customers have does not represent 
a meaningful mode of participation in the process of shaping what the 
institution is. 
 
When universities market themselves as business-type enterprises, it is only 
natural that students should come to think of themselves as consumers. While 
pedagogical relationships continue to have a transformational potential, they 
become weighted down by expectation among students that it is—and should 
be— purely transactional. The official discourse of the university itself may 
champion the very ideas one is trying to dispel or at the very least temper 
among students. For students to see themselves as something more than 
consumers, they need to have the means to recognize and situate their 
concerns within the overall mission of the university. When a university 
employs aspirational language to describe its mission, drawing on ideas and 
symbols associated with the intellectual and ethical dimensions, it may make it 
easier to persuade students the education they have the privilege to receive is 
more than a vocational training program designed to get them jobs, to keep 
the institution solvent, and to supply the local labour market with workers. 
 
With or without such expressions in the formal documents of the university, it 
is incumbent on the community as a whole to flesh out a more robust vision 
for their university.  At the end of the day, it is not the words on the university’s 
website that matter but the actions of those entrusted with working to fulfill its 
purpose as a university. Framing the idea of the enterprising university as a 
matter of governance rather than management, exposes the importance of re-
examining existing structures, processes, rules, and practices within, and 
beyond the university, that foster, as opposed to frustrate the agency of 
students, professors, sessional lecturers, adjuncts, administrators, staff and 
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any other members of the university3. After all, “the best way to ensure the 
commitment of stakeholders to the mission of the organisation is to include 
them in the process of its formulation” (Menon Eliophotou, 2003, p. 239.) And 
yet, it is not just the cheerleaders but also the doomsayers associated with the 
enterprising university who oppose the notion of the ‘lunatics running the 
asylum’, let alone interfering with its administration. They presume students 
are either uninterested or incapable of exercising a constructive decision-
making role. They worry about disruptions in the administrative balance of 
power, and warn of an erosion of academic standards. They take it for granted 
that the best students will be concerned about the potentially negative effect 
of their involvement on their scholastic performance. Moreover, they fear 
those with a narrow political agenda or the winners of popularity contests will 
be vaunted into positions of influence where they will surely cause more harm 
than good. 
 
The substance of these arguments will be familiar to anyone who has looked 
at historical debates over the extension of the franchise. Democratic reform 
has very seldom appealed to anyone as strongly as those on the outside of 
the official corridors of power looking in. There must be recognition that such 
participation is consonant with the fundamental mission of the university itself. 
So long as this awareness is missing in the “enterprising university”, there will 
not be fertile ground for participative democracy to take root. Moreover, there 
must be a corresponding encouragement, opportunity and support to 
participate in the governance of these educational institutions. An important 
role of university is to provide intellectual resources as well as a social 
environment to inform student perspectives, expectations, values and beliefs. 
Allocating seats in university senates, on faculty councils and hiring 
committees offers a step toward formally contributing to a more meaningful, 
deliberative student role in university governance. By itself, such a move may 
amount to little more than tokenism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have attempted to trace the role of governance in the 
cultivation of university as an ethical enterprise. One only starts to see that 
university governance is about more than the mere perfection of managerial 
technique when one rejects the assumption that there is a single best way of 
doing things, regardless of why one wants to do them. Moreover, the fullness 
of any idea of a university may only be appreciated once one is disabused of 
the misconception that, once selected, ends may be achieved 
unproblematically. I have tried to show why it is important to attend to the 
implicit dimensions not just of university governance but of university 
education itself. If doing so has been interpreted as a dodge of setting out 
explicitly what it means for a university to have integrity or stating canonically 
the rules each institution must follow to be an ethical undertaking, so be it. 
The question of integrity and the related question of identity are questions that                                                         
3 In doing so, I am trying to advance discussion beyond debate over the merits and demerits 
of the ‘New Public Management’, which notwithstanding the contemporaneity implied by the 
neologism, have been taking place for nearly a quarter-century (Robertson & Verger, 2012; 
Hood, 1991; Savoie, 1995; Borins 1995). 
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the members of each enterprise, or project through time, must continuously 
ask of, and answer for, their university, as they must also do for themselves. I 
believe that by explicitly defining the object of university as intellectual, not 
moral, Newman was trying to show his audience that the activity of ‘faith 
seeking understanding’ would be compromised were religious convictions 
allowed to smother intellectual curiosity. That universities, like human beings, 
are economic actors is beyond dispute. That some enjoy longer pedigrees, 
wider reputations, and deeper pockets than others makes it tempting to call 
the facilitation of each individual’s pursuit of virtue through the discovery, 
advancement, and dissemination of knowledge, as somehow a luxury, but to 
say that is to demean a precious gift. 
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